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Abstract
Purpose – Agency theory suggests that divergences will occur when a principal, e.g. client, and agent e.g.
a project manager, interests are different in the execution of a project. The purpose of this paper is to explore
if the agency theory can explain the subtleties integral to the behaviours and relationships between players
delivering a public-private-partnership (PPP) in the context of an international development (ID) project.
The intra-/interpersonal dynamics include governments, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and private
commercial service providers. The authors develop a conceptual framework and provide evidence from a case
study of the testing of a Road Safety Toolkit in Kenya to explore several propositions.
Design/methodology/approach – Extant literature identified application of the agency theory, and
the development of a conceptual framework. A case study describing an ID project was used to validate the
propositions prior to the expansion of a research instrument for data collection in the field.
Findings – Through the lens of the agency theory and the limitations imposed by exploring a series of
propositions, several insightful conclusions have been derived from the case. ID projects have particular
nuisances that make them unique when compared to the majority of commercial applications. An added
dimension and level of complexity is a consequence of the PPP incorporating government, NGOs and private
corporations. The case exemplified the need for PPP ID projects to build on partner networks to influence and
disseminate outcomes. Some agency problems were far less prominent than would normally be seen in a
commercial project.
Research limitations/implications – The methodologies presented in this paper need to be adapted and
practiced in different kinds of ID projects in order to get confirmatory analytical results. The limitations
imposed by the use of the single case, whilst drawing insightful conclusions, would necessitate greater testing
in the field.
Practical implications – Although the problems of the agency theory are well researched in the operations
management literature, there is limited application to ID projects and no previous research within the context
of a PPP. Therefore, this work is important for greater understanding of the specific issues associated with
project delivery of an ID.
Social implications – Conflicting goals between principals and agents are common for organisations,
which in turn affect inter-relationships on an international footing. The agency theory has had little attention
in the project management field, yet is fundamental to relationships and communication.
Originality/value – There has been little research that explores the agency theory in the context of a PPP
involving governments, NGOs and private commercial service providers, executed as an ID project.
This work, therefore, exhibits new and novel findings.
Keywords Research, Case studies, Developing countries, Social networks
Paper type Research paper
Introduction
The unacceptable high rate of projects being completed over budget, behind schedule and
without meeting quality and scope requirements is widely recognised (Cullen and Parker,
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to leadership (Nixon et al., 2012), inadequately managed resources (Lim and Mohamed, 1999),
ineffective stakeholder welfare support (Parker et al., 2013) and impoverished communications
(Ceric, 2012). Moreover, international development (ID) projects appear to have an even worse
success rate (Ika and Saint-Macary, 2012; Youker, 1999; Khang and Moe, 2008), with some
countries experiencing as little as 10 per cent planned completion against target (Diallo and
Thuillier, 2004, 2005).
In this study, we follow the early stages through to implementation of a Road Safety
Toolkit for aid organisations that was initially tested in Kenya and which ultimately would
assist humanitarian agencies to develop road safety programmes. Road crashes are the
largest single cause of mortality for non-governmental organisation (NGO) staff in the field.
This case describes how a multi-sector partnership was conceived and delivered, and how the
stakeholders met the challenges of communication and co-ordination. The case allows the
agency theory to be explored through the dynamics of the large number of players operating
within a multi-sector public-private-partnership (PPP): governments, NGOs and private
companies. We explore how agency theory may assist us to understand the relationships
associated with managing ID projects, and ultimately provide insight and so improve project
outcomes. The agency theory has been widely used across a variety of disciplines since its
inception some four decades ago (Eisenhardt, 1989; Hirsch and Friedman, 1986). However,
recently the theory has been given little attention in the operations management and project
management literature. This is remiss as the agency theory applies to most relationship
situations (see Majone, 2001) in which one party (the principal) delegates authority for control
and decision making about certain tasks to another party (the agent) (Basu and Lederer, 2011).
The essential assumption underlying the agency theory is that agents are essentially selfish
opportunists who, unless monitored effectively, will exploit their principals (Miller and
Whitford, 2007). The information asymmetry that exists between agents and their more
distant principals provide the basis for opportunism. It is assumed that the agent will act upon
this unless controlled or “incentivised” not to do so (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen and
Meckling, 1976; Jensen and Ruback, 1983).
The agency theory has been used to explain relationships in the field of economics
and finance (e.g. Sappington, 1991), political science (e.g. Moe, 1984), social sciences
(e.g. Shapiro, 2005), information systems, (e.g. Mahaney and Lederer, 2011) and
management, generally (e.g. Donaldson and Davis, 1991). More recently, it has been
applied to supply chain management (e.g. Zsidisin and Ellram, 2003) and project
management (e.g. Forsythe et al., 2015; Ceric, 2012). The theory was first formulated in the
economics literature ( Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Ross, 1973) as a quantitative and conceptual
approach to investigate the nature of resulting costs. Subsequently, an empirical focus has
emerged to explore organisational behaviour and corporate governance (Cuevas-Rodríguez
et al., 2012). This empirical approach is referred to as the positivist agency theory (Eisenhardt,
1989) and is popular in management research. In a more adjunct capacity, is the research in
trust and relationships (Brewer and Strahorn, 2012; Zwikael and Smyrk, 2015; Aubert and
Kelsey, 2000), asymmetric information (Ceric, 2012; Xiang et al., 2012), communication
(Turner and Müller, 2004; Diallo and Thuillier, 2005), and the extensive literature on project
risks and their management (e.g. Maqsood, 2011), with Chang (2014) researching risks in
construction contracts through the lens of a principal-agent model.
Because the project client/owner has limited resources, such as time or specialist knowledge,
a person or entity is contracted to perform specific activities required to complete the project.
Ross (1973) identified such relationships as classic agency arrangement. Subsequently, Mitnick
(2013) asserted that all contractual arrangements contain important elements of agency. Most
commercial relationships can be seen as an agency relationship (Bergen et al., 1992). The more
the interests between the agent and the principal align, the higher the probability that the agent



















































that the principal will need to use control mechanisms such as monitoring: referred to as
“agency costs” (Xiang et al., 2012). Turner and Müller (2004) used the organisational theory to
explain the nature of a project, which they describe as a temporary organisation. They also use
the agency theory to explain the project owner (principal) appointing the project manager
(agent) as the chief executive of the project, similar to that of a company owner. Turner and
Müller (2004) explained how another hierarchy above the project manager must be in place to
control the activities of the agent similarly to a company board. Such a project board exists in
PRINCE2 where the board can oversee and monitor the actions of the project manager (Office
of Government Commerce, 2005).
Using the agency theory, it is possible to evaluate relationships parsimoniously so as to
assess their fragility across a range of factors. Thus, a critical question for operations
management and project management is:
RQ1. How should those associated with the planning, delivery and execution of a project
benefit by gaining greater understanding of agency theory and implication of
levels of trust?
Our study will examine howmanagement governance choices transform agency relationships
between project teams and their organisations, thereby allowing them to understand the
mechanisms of project governance and its implications. The focus of our work and particular
interest is in how the agency theory can contribute to our understanding of project
management within the context of ID projects. Applying the agency theory to an ID project is
particularly interesting because of the nature of these projects wherein the presence of
information asymmetry between principal and agent is particularly high and complex.
Khang and Moe (2008) provided a relevant conceptual framework in this instance, focusing on
critical success factors (CSFs) in ID projects over the project’s lifecycle. In this paper, the
principal-agent interactions occur between the government donor and a NGO in the country
where the project is to be carried out (also referred to as the implementing agency).
This context provides a rich opportunity to explore relationships using the agency theory
(Bebbington, 2005). Moreover, the importance of ID projects cannot be overstated:
The success of these projects determines the socioeconomic progress in the recipient countries but
also the effectiveness of the contribution of the donor countries and agencies. Understanding the
critical factors that influence project success enhances the ability of donors and implementing
agencies to ensure desired outcomes (Khang and Moe, 2008, p. 72).
Given the two perspectives of the agency theory (Eisenhardt, 1989): first, positivist agency
theory where the principal and agent are likely to have conflicting goals; the theory is thus
used to describe governance means to reduce the self-serving behaviour; and second,
principal agency theory, where the trade-off occurs between the cost of measuring
behaviour and the cost of measuring outcomes and transferring the risk to the agent, are
especially relevant to ID. This is shown schematically in Figure 1.
By definition, the objectives of ID projects are to reduce poverty and improve living
standards, and to enhance environment protection and the building of physical and social
infrastructures (Khang and Moe, 2008). These humanitarian and social objectives are
usually much less tangible, with deliverables less visible and measurable than with
infrastructure and industrial projects. Another characteristic of most ID projects is that a
complex web of many stakeholders is involved (Youker, 1999). ID projects commonly
involve three separate stakeholders, namely the funding agency that pays for but does not
directly use the project outputs, the implementing unit and the target beneficiaries who
actually benefit from the project outputs but most commonly do not pay for the projects.
The role separation of these three key stakeholder groups has several important



















































considered as important as its responsibility to complete the projects within the time, cost
and quality. Second, because of the common developmental, cultural and knowledge gap
between donors and the target recipients, the likely mismatch between the real needs and
capacity of the target groups and the understanding and development policies of
the funding agencies may result in poor project design, a precursor of failure in the
implementation. Third, complicating the requirements for financial accountability are the
efforts by the funding agencies and the governments of the recipient countries to establish
rules and procedures to regulate the disbursement and utilisation of the development funds.
Therefore, our work seeks to answer the following question: how significant is the
application of the agency theory in identifying the rationality of relationships within an ID
project given that individuals will prefer behaviour that maximise their utility given two
conditions: first, the agency theory holds that bilateral relationships between principals and
agents (i.e. the two interested parties involved) are guided by their agreeing about the most
efficient contract that would align their individual interests as each faces information
asymmetry with the other. Second, while the agency theory assumes that every economic
relationship is influenced by individual interests and opportunism, within ID projects, the
mechanism that supports effective control of monitoring and sufficient incentives need to be
clear. Therefore, by concentrating on the project organisation dyad of these two interested
parties, we identify the tactics deployed to diminish information asymmetry and how a new
approach to ID projects might be fostered. To inform practitioners and expand project
management research, this study responds to the call from project-as-practice researchers
who examine the activities of participants in relevant contexts (Blomquist et al., 2010).
The agency theory’s utility for examining ID projects will become more apparent by
noting both the problems that the agency theory seeks to identify and identifying methods
to overcome these problems. This study contributes to research both operations and project
management by providing theoretical arguments for understanding how interested parties
make decisions on their individual approaches under different conditions when undertaking
ID projects. We seek to answer the research question by exploring parsimoniously the
interplay between these interested parties using the agency theory within a framework that
focuses on CSFs in ID projects over the project lifecycle.
We begin by reviewing the current research into ID projects and how they differ to the
commercial arena. Then, we introduce the agency theory and its assumptions and followed
by the relevance of the agency theory to ID projects. Then, using the agency theory,
we present two categories of ID practices: the positivist agency theory and principal agency
theory and their respective sub-categories. We then examine the factors that may influence
Self-











Notes: PO, project owner; C, contractor; PMpo, project owner’s project manager;
























































the approaches that principal takes in the interest of better managing agents’ project
delivery quality. Relevant propositions are derived that relate the agency-based factors in
buyer-supplier relationships to the ID projects. Drawing on the propositions within the
framework of this paper, we explore their explanatory qualities by drawing on an ID
case study. In our “Discussion” section, we derive a range of conclusions and their
implications for ID projects. Finally, we discuss the implications for research and practice in
operations management and project management and offer critical questions that will form
an agenda for future research in this area.
Project management
Project-based management is involved with approximately 30 per cent of global GDP
(Parker et al., 2013) with mega projects (multi-billion dollars) representing the single largest
capital spends (Cullen and Parker, 2015; Müller and Jugdev, 2012). How to successfully
undertake a project and what factors influence the success of projects are the most studied
topics in the operations management and project management literature (Müller and
Jugdev, 2012). Pinto and Slevin (1988) argued that there are 14 critical factors, including
client consultation, personnel, monitoring and feedback, communication, power and politics,
types of contracts used, organisational structures and strength of collaboration between
parties. Such factors are consistent with the agency theory (Müller and Turner, 2005) where
types of contract (outcome-oriented, behaviour-oriented), measures of communication and
relationship are evaluated against the perceived success of the project. To minimise (agency)
costs, Turner and Müller (2004) included methods and frequencies for project owner and
manager communication.
Projects are now increasingly common across a wide range of activities and industries;
arguably because they provide an efficient means for mobilising talented people to complete
specific tasks (Project Management Institute, 2013; Gann and Salter, 2003). However, project
work leads to frequent moves between temporary teams, which significantly influence
personal relationships (Bredin and Söderlund, 2011). In ID projects, additional factors play
their part (e.g. language and cultural issues) (McShane et al., 2010). The success of a project
refers to relying on all parties to perform well in projects (Das and Teng, 2001).
Mahaney and Lederer (2003) focused on how the agency theory explains project success,
concluding that monitoring led to project success and that outcome-based contracts did not
relate significantly to project success. These authors also argued that monitoring reduces
privately held information and this improves project success. Monitoring also provides
feedback to the agent to ensure that they are working towards the correct end-goal that is
not ambiguous (Levitt and Snyder, 1997). Müller and Turner (2005) found that while
extensive collaboration and a mid-level project operational structure contribute to high
project performance, an overly structured control and monitoring process hinders the
chances of project success. Zwikael and Smyrk (2015) explored a control-trust-risk approach
in project governance and the balance between control and trust in a principal (owner’s
representative)-agent (project manager) relationship. They found that, during a turbulent
project involving high risk, a trust-based relationship is superior while more control leads to
a superior management strategy within a more stable environment. Clearly, these findings
have consequences in ID projects.
Agency theory
The agency theory explains the relationship between the principal and the agent when the
agent has been engaged by the principal to make decisions and act on their behalf (Mahaney
and Lederer, 2003). Fundamentally, when ownership and control are separated, the agency
problem arises because of agency cost (Cuevas-Rodríguez et al., 2012). The body of literature



















































cooperating parties not necessarily sharing the same interests (Eisenhardt, 1989).
When asymmetric information exists between a principal and an agent, where one of the
parties is better informed than the other, which invariably is the agent (Schieg, 2008),
the information-rich party can opportunistically operate with self-interest rather than in the
interests of the other party and to the ultimate benefit of the project. This is normally achieved
through contractual mechanisms that govern the project (Mahaney and Lederer, 2003).
Research into the agency theory in supply management (Fayezi et al., 2012) shows that
increased monitoring allows the principal to receive information that is less
asymmetrical. Owing to hidden information and confidentiality, the principal cannot
guarantee that the agent will be mobilising their capabilities to support the principal’s project,
or that the agent is serving another client/principal, as an agent can serve more than one
principal at a time (Unsal and Taylor, 2010).
Concerning agency cost as the agency problem, Jensen and Meckling (1976) described
agency cost as the sum of the monitoring expenses incurred by the principal, the bonding
expenditure by the agent and the residual loss which is equivalent of the reduction in
benefits received by the principal as a result of the agent’s desire to maximise their own
utility. Lyonnet du Moutier (2010) and Mahaney and Lederer (2003) described agency cost
as the financial implications arising from the interests between the principal and the agent
not being shared. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) categorised agency cost into four types of
agent opportunism: over investment, insufficient effort, entrenchment strategies, and self-
serving behaviour.
Relevance of agency theory to ID projects
Diallo and Thuillier (2004, 2005) identified four high-level success factors in ID projects: the
project profile (its political value), project management (how the project was executed,
chiefly in terms of the iron triangle of time, cost and quality), the impact (the extent of the
effects on the beneficiaries), and trust and communication (at all levels of the aid chain).
Khang and Moe (2008) developed CSFs for ID projects which they applied to the various
stages of the project’s lifecycle. Empirical studies have identified that the values and
preferences of players could be aligned through establishing a clear project mandate being
at the scoping stage of project design (Linger and Owen, 2012). Forsythe et al. (2015)
researched information asymmetry within a building information modelling system to find
that such a system can provide identical information impartially. While asymmetric
information may lead to mistrust and opportunistic behaviour, it also leads to potential risks
(Ceric, 2012). While parties in an agency relationship may have conflicting attitudes towards
risk and sharing risk, these parties may prefer different actions or make different decisions
because of their risk perspective (Ceric, 2012). Risks associated with information asymmetry
( Jäger, 2008) are that characteristics, information and intentions are all hidden
(Winch, 2010). The different risk preferences are linked to the possible gains to be made
by the principal or agent (Hendry, 2002).
Hidden characteristics may result in adverse selection decisions and thus lead to moral
risks because the agent may act in their own interests. While screening and monitoring reduce
adverse selection, moral hazard and delays (Mahaney and Lederer, 2003), these actions may
be detrimental to mutual trust and cooperation. The agency theory is predicated on the notion
that there is a negative trade-off between risk and incentives (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1987).
A method of addressing the agency theory problem is incentivising (Hockenbury and
Hockenbury, 2003). The incentive theory focuses on tasks that are too complicated or too
costly to do oneself (Sappington, 1991). Thus, the principal is obliged to hire an agent with
specialised skills or knowledge to perform the task in question. In addition, time constraints
may also be a reason for hiring an agent (Perrow, 1986). The dilemma is how the principal



















































difficulties in monitoring the agent’s activities. While incentive systems contain
mechanisms that offer rewards to the agent for acting in accordance with the principal’s
desires (e.g. financial or penalties), they have been shown to have limited effect (Mitnick,
2013; Jensen and Murphy, 1990).The popular commercial view that controlling and
monitoring agent behaviour becomes unnecessary if the right incentives to divert the
agent’s interest in the direction of the principal’s goals have only a specific project benefit
(Miller andWhitford, 2007). Ross (1973) showed that incentivising into agency alleviated the
problems of compensation-contracting because agency was seen, in essence, as an incentive.
Schieg (2008) recommended six methods to minimise risks associated with information
asymmetry: bureaucratic control (e.g. project contracts and governance); information
systems (e.g. information modelling systems and project reporting); incentives and bonuses;
corporate culture (e.g. effective processes and the right people); reputation (e.g. gain repeat
business); and trust (e.g. stewardship relationships). Levitt and Snyder (1997) looked at the
asymmetric information problem facing the principal, and considered how to elicit early
warning signs from agents during projects. Their research analysed how the principal can
encourage agents to give this information by encouraging and rewarding their behaviour.
They argue that the principal must not excessively intervene, or reprimand if the news is
bad, when agents come to them with early warnings.
Projects provide the environment in which agency problems are likely to occur (Bredin
and Söderlund, 2011). Projects define necessary skill requirements, one of which involves
close collaboration between experts of various disciplinary fields and areas of expertise.
Gann and Salter (2003) added that the typical make-up of the team is a group of people, most
of whom have never met before (Lindqvist, 2005). Because projects are relatively short term,
the project teams are often unfamiliar with one another, thus leaving projects susceptible
to agency problem. Given that non-project work-teams benefit from “clan control”
(Eisenhardt, 1989), we can assume that project team is likely to lack such goal congruence
between team members without as much chance to know and trust one another. This
reduces the need to monitor behaviour or outcomes as motivational issues are minimised
(Dirks and Ferrin, 2001). Lambert (1983) found that principals learn about their agents
through longer-term relationships, thus in short-term relationships the asymmetry of
information is significant and can be used to the agent’s benefit and thereby reduce risks.
It is acknowledged that most project risks are not technical but managerial (Shenhar and
Dvir, 2007). Managers therefore have generally four options for responding to risk: avoid;
transfer; mitigate; or accept (Chang, 2014). Responses to agency problems would be:
avoidance, although it is difficult to achieve as it would result in the principal acting as the
project manager which is often not feasible. The principal could simply not continue with
the project because a project manager would not be able to be appointed. Often, the risk of
an agency problem is paid little heed.
Allen and Lueck (1995) state that the principal is normally risk-neutral while the agent is
risk averse. Because agents can make decisions that affect their welfare as well as their
principal’s, they may have negatively affected results. Additionally, because of information
asymmetry, the agent’s decision excludes agreements related to action and payment
(Anurag, 1997). To improve the situation, the incentive method needs to maximise expected
outcomes (Grossman and Hart, 1992). However, increasing financial rewards can increase an
agent’s risk preference. As a result, the principal and agent can have contracts with complex
incentive methods.
Important to considering risk is to be aware that trust between the parties becomes
manifest when information is regularly shared (Lewicki et al., 2006). Aubert and Kelsey
(2000, p. 199) identified the benefits of a trusting relationship between the principal and the
agent: “Trust in a contractual relationship can facilitate the exchange of information and



















































fear any manifestations of opportunism”. A level of trust and mistrust underpins a
professional working relationship (Brewer and Strahorn, 2012) and is regarded as
a reciprocal mechanism with vulnerability to both parties; the trustor must display trusting
behaviour, while the trustee needs to display behaviour that is trustworthy (Brewer and
Strahorn, 2012). Trust is primarily gained through the perceived integrity and competence
of the other party (Aubert and Kelsey, 2000).
Conceptual framework and hypotheses
The ID literature points to an outcome-based contract, in that the agent aligns to the
principal’s goals, as being appropriate in most instances (Balkin et al., 2000). Monitoring is
likely to decrease information asymmetry between two parties but may not be
cost-effective (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). Tasks with less programmability can lead to
more problems with agents (Guinan et al., 1998). Figure 2 illustrates that, depending
on the nature of the ID project, the principal has first to decide whether to use
outcome-based or behaviour-orientated contracts (a) and then adjust to what extent
the contract follows agency or stewardship theory or (b) make the project manager
the principal.
Critical to project success are communication and collaboration between project owner
and project manager, donor and NGO, or principal and agent. As has been observed earlier
in this paper, ever-increasing reporting requirements have hindered ID projects and
thus suggest that the balance of the contract between donor and agent has gone too far
towards behaviour contracts. There are, of course, multiple levels of principal-agent
relationships throughout an organisation (Kiser, 1999) and indeed throughout the aid
chain. This is recognised in our framework because it evaluates agency matters between
the donor and NGO, or project team and contractors, as the case may be. Our framework
also assumes that the actors are altruistic and will want to act for the IDs project’s good.
Further discussion of success factors and criteria in the management of international
projects, as evidenced from projects funded by the European Union, can be found in
Bayiley and Teklu (2016). Similarly, a study by Yalegama et al. (2016) identified the CSFs
of community-driven development (CDD) projects in Sri Lanka from different
stakeholder’s perspectives. Whilst CDDs are a different type of ID project, they do offer
insightful propositions on how cultural and value differences might affect the perception
of CSFs in other countries, and how these might be different.
Although this somewhat contradicts the traditional agency theory, this approach was
also taken by Azam and Laffont (2003), who considered donors in their framework. Indeed,






































































considered to be altruistic, the donors and NGOs will still think differently about how that
public good can be achieved, meaning that moral hazard remains an issue. Our proposed
conceptual framework for testing is depicted in Figure 3.
However, it is acknowledged that there is conjecture regarding the fit between traditional
project management concepts and the reality witnessed in many ID projects. It is argued:
Since project management has been at the core of ID from the very beginning, it is quite legitimate
to question how PMs carry out their roles as we seek to understand what they accomplish and how.
Is project management a misnomer in the field of ID, and more specifically, how is it practiced in
that field and what are its PMs really doing? (Ika and Saint-Macary, 2012 p. 421).
The work of Ika and Saint-Macary (2012) challenges the assumptions of prescribed project
management stages in ID projects and suggest that the evidence from several
international projects (Chad-Cameroon pipeline project, a World Bank project and a large
investment in Sub-Saharan Africa) indicate that little structured planning takes place.
Moreover, “asymmetry of power impedes PMs ability to deliver development” (p. 431).
This is classic agency behaviour.
Conceptualising phase
The selection of the right implementing agency is an important phase in ID projects.
There is a good chance that the principal (donor) will lack knowledge of both the country
where the project is to be implemented and the local agents (NGOs) that will implement the
project. It is important to select the NGO experienced in implementing similar projects to
ensure greater goal congruence between principal and agent. Issues of moral hazard may
arise throughout the project, thus increasing the need for monitoring and agency costs.
Consequently a proposition for testing is:





Critical Success Factors Agency Theory Impact







Compatible PM rules and procedures
Continuing stakeholder support and
consultation
Commitment to project goals
PM team competence




and adverse selection risk through
consultation. Goal alignment through
careful selection of local partner
Reduce information asymmetry and
adverse selection through local
partner’s knowledge. Use a balanced
contract to empower and incentivize
Previous steps will impact here.
Balanced contract will promote
principal-agent collaboration.
Utilise knowledge of both actors in
 decision making
Previous steps will impact here.
Balanced contract = shared success.

























































In an ID project, involving the local partner extensively in this stage of the process is critical to
its success. The donor can help address issues of information asymmetry by respecting and
using the NGO’s knowledge about how to implement the project and allow them to contribute
to the project design process extensively. To achieve this, the agency theory calls for a balanced
contract between principal and agent. Müller and Turner (2005) have demonstrated that this is
also the best approach for ensuring continued communication between parties which, in turn,
should improve chances of project success. Goal congruence continues to be an essential factor
in this stage of the project and might be improved by establishing a formal process of
documenting a shared statement of goals. Consequently, the proposition for testing are:
P2a. Was a process followed to engage stakeholders when planning the ID project?
P2b. Are there periodic reviews planned for throughout the entire lifecycle of the project?
Implementing phase
As noted by Khang andMoe (2008), the steps taken in the conceptualising and planning phases
will help the implementing phase to progress. Continued communication and collaboration
between donor and NGO, facilitated by a balanced contract, will help ensure the best chance of
the project succeeding. Khang andMoe’s (2008) framework shows some limitation in this phase
as it does not specifically allow for flexibility in the execution of the project. Rather, it evaluates
this phase of the project by how the activities and outputs defined in the planning phase are
executed. The continued close communication between agent and principal should minimise
any issues of mistrust or suspicion of moral hazard that arise from this flexibility. Therefore, in
the planning phase of the project, a mandate needs to be developed for auditing the project
consistently. According to Pinto (1990), these audits should be conducted both at regular
intervals and at critical times (e.g. set milestones such as when beginning a new project phase):
P3. Is there flexibility in implementing the ID project?
Closing phase
The effectiveness of this final phase will be largely influenced by the conceptualising and
planning phases. However, it is in the interests of both parties to see this phase completed
effectively. The donor is therefore likely to reward the agent’s initiative in shaping
and implementing the project by choosing them to implement future ID projects. Moreover,
as the donor knows that the agent is capable of successfully completing an ID project, the
chances of adverse selection and the need for strict monitoring and behaviour controls are
reduced in the future. Hence, criteria for reporting the project’s achievements and success
must be established. This can be done in two ways: by assessing the project management
success and the actual project success (time, quality, and cost). Development impacts should
therefore be used as criteria to assess the acceptance of the development aid by the intended
recipients. This entails identifying that the correct beneficiaries and their relevant needs
have been targeted, and that these match the priorities of the donors. The selection of an
implementing agency with the willingness to carry out the donor’s vision for the project in
the conceptualising phase is identified as critical to the project’s success in this regard:
P4. Does principal and agent prior positive experience influence project outcome?
Methodology
Cases and testing proposition
Prior to undertaking extensive empirical field research, with the underlying need of



















































of hypotheses (a development from use of propositions), we explored conceptual and
theoretical validity by grounding the model with a small case study. Such confirmatory
reflection of hypotheses using published cases is an established research method (Yin, 2013).
Detailed, longitudinal case studies are appropriate for studying poorly understood
phenomena (Marshall and Rossman, 2014) and, where contextualisation and vivid
descriptions of organisational behaviours are important. The case study is an appropriate
method to explore the initial hypotheses that will be used to answer the research question.
A case study is beneficial because it facilitates the investigation of a phenomenon in its
real-life context (Rowley, 2004). We focus on a single ID project because it provides
unusually revelatory information (Yin, 2013). The case was selected as it has a number of
unique qualities that make it a logical candidate for theoretical sampling, and it displays
characteristics of a revelatory case (Yin, 2013). The case presented an unusual opportunity
to study an ID project in which inherent risks and uncertainties are extreme and good
relationships and high-level of trust are necessary (Ika and Saint-Macary, 2012). Because of
the lack of knowledge on the agency theory in ID projects, this research started with
assumptions from the literature in a range of fields. The research follows an approach that
can best be described as theory elaboration (Ketokivi and Choi, 2014). Compared to testing a
theory, in theory elaboration the empirical data serve to illustrate an existing general
conceptual or theoretical framework.
Case agency evaluation: ID aid project
Gatignon and van Wassenhove (2010) developed the fleet safety project, which we use here
to exemplify our methods, in response to the needs of 40 members of the Fleet Forum, a
collaborating amalgamation of organisations that supply vehicles and provide advice on
fleet management in the humanitarian sector. Put simply, this ID project would: produce
material that would assist humanitarian agencies develop road safety programmes.
These agencies had neither the resources nor know-how to organise the project on their own.
Road crashes are the largest single cause of mortality for NGO staff in the field. With the
backing of the Danish Government aid agency, Danida, the project drew on the resources of
government, the humanitarian sector and private companies to develop, test and distribute
a Road Safety Toolkit for aid organisations. This case describes how a multi-sector
partnership was conceived and delivered, and how the stakeholders met the challenges of
communication and co-ordination. The case allows the agency theory to be explored
through the dynamics of the large number of players operating within a multi-sector PPP:
governments, NGOs and private companies. The case has been analysed using the
conceptual framework developed in this research (refer Figure 4).
Players and stakeholders: $500,000, half the total funding, was donated by Danida, the
Danish Government’s aid and development agency. A formal proposal was submitted to
Danida by the Kjaer Group (supplier of some 70,000 vehicles) and the Fleet Forum.
The proposal detailed the project cycles, objectives, benefits, resources required and the
private organisations and NGOs involved (see Table AI). The project management team
comprised representatives from Fleet Forum, the Kjaer Group, TNT and GRSP.
What ensued were lengthy debates over many months between Forum members and the
project team, with the result that a final training toolkit was specified. The project scope
comprised fleet safety management training and drivers training.
The United Nations World Food Programme (WFP) agreed to manage the project funds.
Momenta a UK-based company specialising in private-sector advisory services was selected
to design and draw up the toolkit. For input on specific topics such as environmental
management, HIV and AIDS policies for truck drivers, specialised agencies such as United
Nations Environment Programme and the North Star Foundation were used. Promotion of



















































facility and the FIA Foundation. At the same time, private partners such as Shell, Sakhalin,
BIG and Johnson & Johnson were asked to contribute to the project by sharing both their
experience and their own road safety guidelines.
The controlling project team soon became aware of the complex problem of managing
and communicating with large numbers of project partners. (Table AI shows the
organisation profiles). There were often times when conflicts and decision were raising
issues: the partnership found its equilibrium through straightforward negotiation among
team members and trade-offs involved give and take. The first significant issue occurred
when there was wide-spread dissatisfaction with the unwieldy 100-page draft toolkit
submitted by Momenta. This resulted in the management team taking ownership of its
writing. The view was that Momenta really did not understand what was needed and had
gone their own way. Eventually the toolkit was launched in a pilot study in Kenya, with
Oxfam, World Vision International, ADRA, Goal, Care International and WFP.
Four different types of workshops were held. Local Kenya logistics and transport experts
were contracted to lead transport operations workshops. Two-day driver training sessions
took place under the guidance of local driving instructors. At the same time, TNT and an
NGO called Safe Wheels carried out four-day “train the trainer” sessions. Unfortunately,
poor communication often resulted in cancellations and lack of participation. Coordinating
so many agencies was proving difficult – operating Kenya compounded the problem – and
soon the rainy season was imminent. Moreover, political unrest and the threat of riots made
staying in the country unsafe. The project team returned to Amsterdam, leaving the pilot
only three-quarters complete.
Eventually, it was considered safe to return to Kenya and the postponed sessions were
resumed. By the time the pilot ended, the toolkit had been tested on 1,500 staff, representing
thousands of hours training for the organisations involved. During the project’s closing
session the management team set about harnessing the knowledge gained from the pilot.
Participant surveys, reports and interviews were reviewed for possible future
improvements. Eventually, the “Fleet Safety Toolkit” was circulated for final comments
before a final version was printed and ready for distribution. The toolkit had become a
55-page guide to fleet safety for humanitarian organisations, complete with minimum
standards, checklists and detailed recommendations on implementing.
Validating the propositions with the case
The case is a complex example of an ID project involving a large number of players within a
multi-sector PPP being delivered in challenging circumstances. While the case allows
Conceptualising Planning Implementing Closing




































































numerous facets of ID projects to be examined, in this instance, we use the agency theory to
explore the principal and various agencies within the limitations of the propositions.
However, what becomes apparent when reviewing the case is that, while agency issues
are apparent in the case, their criticality is dramatically diminished in the PPP ID project.
The underlying assumption in the agency theory is that agents are pursuing financial
benefit; this is not the case in a humanitarian project.
P1. Was a structured process followed when selecting the agents?
Support is at the core of this PPP ID project, while the partners concerned have different
objectives, values and cultures but they are sharing risks, responsibilities, resources,
and competencies to achieve their individual objectives (Rangan et al., 2006). Because no
formal process applied during the conceptualising and planning stages, a comment made by
a member of the core project team was:
The objective of the project was not defined at the start, it evolved over time; this was primarily
due to the nature of it being a PPP alliance, which by definition has multiple-decision-making
centres. This makes alliances considerably more complex to manage than projects with a single
chain of command.
The initial phases of the ID project identified vague strategic objectives, conflicting
priorities and a lack of transparency of costs and benefits of participating in the project.
Such initial issues are common in PPPs (Dussage and Garrette, 1999). The choice and
selection of partners was an ad hoc process that relied upon recommendations from
associates and players, and did not involve any tendering or formal assessment. Moreover,
NGOs were selected because of their experience; private commercial agents were
approached as a result of their creditability. There was little ongoing monitoring, which
meant no agency costs were attracted, and low levels of moral hazard were experienced.
P2a. Was a process followed to engage stakeholders when planning the ID project?
The project’s conceptualising and planning identified specific objectives and value creation,
which fit exactly with the funding agencies missions (World Bank, 2004; Danida, 2014). Also
notable is that, because long-term relationships were importantly built with the funding
agencies for future projects, no one could afford to antagonise them. Consequently, elements
of the project’s scope and objectives were clearly humanitarian in nature, which were
non-monetary and difficult to quantify. Less formal arrangements were used such as
memoranda of understanding, and even oral agreements instead of contracts:
In an ID project such as this alliance, a player cannot force the others to accept any particular
solution or direction to take. While the management and co-ordination has been entrusted to one
person or group, it would not be taken kindly on the part of the dominant leadership to impose too
many of its own decisions against the wishes of the others.
A formal proposal was submitted to Danida by the Kjaer Group and the Fleet Forum
showing the breakdown of expenditure. While much of the planning resulted from meetings
of the core management team, this was not copied to Danida. Evidence of the project’s
success was in the delivery of the training toolkit.
P2b. Are there periodic reviews planned for throughout the entire lifecycle of the project?
In the case, principal and agents shared similar goals and no financial reward was required
to meet the targets. Aspects of the PPP are what make ID projects different from
commonplace applications. The case illustrates the variety of imperatives and strategic
objectives held by the players and stakeholders. Most apparent was that the corporate



















































imperative and speedy delivery, improving living standards, local capacity building
and altruism. Consequently, periodic reviews and scheduled reporting were often ignored.
In the commercial world, outcome-based incentives prove to be more motivating,
leading to more successful project outcomes, than relying on monitoring. Conversely,
behavioural-based relationships focus on an agent’s skills and behaviour (ethics), regardless
of project outcomes.
P3. Is there flexibility in implementing the ID project?
The agency theory assumes that there should be continued close communication between
agent and principal to minimise any issues of mistrust or suspicion of moral hazard that
may arise. However, it was noticeable from the case that operational imperatives were
markedly different between NGOs and private corporations. For example, the Kjaer Group
focused on pushing corporate practices such as key performance indicators, resource
management, scheduling and diarised meetings, whereas the NGOs were used to operating
in such a way that such activities are of low priority. The case showed at times that sectors
banded together when negotiating but without prior planning or monitoring. However,
informal and regular progress meetings took place.
P4. Does principal and agent prior positive experience influence the project outcome?
The dynamics of the players was particularly influential in meeting the project’s objectives.
The core management team had extensive prior experience of one another through previous
ID projects. That team members came from the same sector were of the same nationality,
and had similar experiences simplified what was otherwise a complex project. Having a
committed group of players is not uncommon in ID projects because shared value systems
invariably dilute other conflict.
Discussion
While Mahaney and Lederer (2003) said that monitoring may act as a motivating factor in
completing tasks to get praise from the principal, Saam (2007) argued that the
perfect monitoring systems do not exist and that pure information systems are expensive
and time consuming. Beyer et al. (2012) suggest that, in theory, project owners can lead with
perfect efficiency because their goal is to maximise overall profits. This indicates that goal
conflict is non-existent. Agents may be so independently minded that they will continue to
pursue their own goals regardless of contract type; this is especially true for ID
countries where such agents are in high demand. Beyer et al. (2012) demonstrated that
entrenched managers use their discretion for pursuing their own interests at the cost
of the principal.
External pressures such as government policies, economic climate, competitor actions,
technological change, social and environmental setbacks, civil unrest or military conflict
cause unforeseeable and uncontrollable variations on project outcomes (Sharp and
Salter, 1997). In such circumstances, while passing the risk to the agent may seem an
attractive idea, it becomes increasingly expensive to the principal as the agent will
demand a higher price to compensate for the additional risk (Fassina, 2004). Contrariwise,
behavioural-based contracts may motivate agents to make more defensible project decisions
(Lerner and Tetlock, 1999). Because the governance rules within a community of practice
would regulate behaviour standards, those who break the rules are punished through social
sanctions (Henisz et al., 2012). Across a wide array of situations, collective norms or senses
of identity has been shown to alter individual behaviour compliance with or the successful
invocation of psychological perceptions (Ring and Van de Ven, 1994). For the community of



















































would need to be known. Meyerson et al. (1996) argue that, when the pool of possible staff
and talent becomes scarce, and information on performance is diffused, reputations become
vulnerable. Principals should be able to capitalise on this vulnerability and tap into the
communities of practice when seeking a manager for their projects. Selecting one who is an
active and respected member of the community of practice may reduce agency behaviour.
Conclusions
Through the lens of the agency theory and the limitations imposed by exploring a series of
propositions, several insightful conclusions have been derived from the case. ID projects have
particular nuances that make them unique compared to the majority of commercial
applications. An added dimension and other complexity result from the PPP incorporating
government, NGOs and private corporations. The case examined in this paper exemplified the
need for PPP ID projects to build on partner networks to influence and disseminate information
about outcomes. To achieve this needs differing organisational cultures to be recognised and
managed. While funding is critical, in-kind commitment of support is necessary. Conventional
scoping, scheduling and budgetary control lack the flexibility required by ID projects, and is
better served by adopting a sequence of conceptualising, planning, implementing and closing.
Given the characteristics of many developing countries, there is a need to have realistic
expectations of the time required, and acknowledging that it is not always possible to plan
accurately. Climate, security, geography, political aspects and the durability of the project team
over a long time period are considerable challenges. While all the problems associated with
agency relationships are apparent in the case under review, their criticality to the objectives of
the PPP ID project is far less than what it might be in a commercial environment. The
underlying assumption in the agency theory is that agents pursue financial benefit or other
self-gratifying goals; this is not the case in a humanitarian project.
A theory-elaborating case, such as the case examined in this study, provides perspectives
and theoretical ideas for future research. A limitation is that findings are based on a specific
case. Future research could collect large-scale data from other cases or examples and thus test
an expanded range of hypotheses. This exploratory work has identified several interesting
phenomena: for example, that ID projects, while having unique characteristics, also exhibit
classic features of the agency theory. Further work is currently being based on several large
projects to refine and develop our understanding of theory in ID projects. Clearly there is a
need to quantify in detail the impact of agency relationships, potential goal conflicts between
principals and agents, information asymmetry, levels of acceptable risk and how comparative
study with commercial projects might bring greater insight.
The implications from this work for managers of ID projects, the various players,
i.e. NGOs, commercial contractors, government agencies, clients and policy makers include
aspects that are specific to the nuances of this specific case but also hold relevancy for
similar international projects. Projects are dynamic systems; they cannot be carried
out efficiently without trust between key stakeholders. Communication and
inter-intrarelationships are inseparable, and in ID projects, they are critical factors of
outcome success. The launching seminars organised by the donor agencies, as seen in our
case example, were critical to selling the initiative to the on-ground stakeholders rather than
creating a good working climate within the project team. Despite the ubiquitous use of
electronic communication, the semi-virtual ID project teams cannot avoid the contact and
face-to-face communication. The on-ground meetings were especially important ones that
helped establish trust. Multilateral donor agencies should assess regularly the level of trust,
project by project, between the project manager and the various players. Our study does not
come to any conclusions of a comparative nature, and does not reveal behaviours specific to
an African environment as compared to other international locations. This was not our



















































development projects we anticipate transference of learning from this work. We plan on
pursuing this further, since databases are currently being assembled on ID projects.
A transcultural analysis of the empirical results through the lens of the agency theory from
a larger survey would allow us to confirm the results from the African case and perhaps
even to discover cultural differences in the importance of the agency theory.
For ID project managers and agencies it should be recognised that the agency theory is
based on the assumption that both principals and agents are rational economic-maximising
individuals. This does not hold for either the agency or the private investor. Studies have
shown that governments are often driven by other than purely economic motives. Also,
studies of private-commercial investors show that they do not always see the monetary
rewards as the most essential. The agency theory assumes that the principal building
control mechanism is to prevent opportunistic behaviour from the agent (i.e. a “negative”
relationship between the principal and agent). The relationship between the private investor
and government sponsor has a more “positive” character, where the interaction is based on
support and mutual trust. In many cases the control mechanism functions as a
dysfunctional factor, lowering trust between the principal and agent, which impedes open
communication. The agency theory also assumes that there is an information asymmetry
between the principal and agent which facilitates the agent’s opportunistic behaviour. The
negotiations between the private investor and NGO or other funding agency, and the
personal relationship between them can result in less information asymmetries and less
opportunistic behaviour, and therefore substitute for detailed monitoring mechanisms.
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Sector Name Project role





Fleet Forum membersa,c Network of NGOs and private companies to address
issues facing NGOs with their vehicles
North Star Foundationd Public-private partnership to set up clinics for HIV and
AIDS throughout Africa
Oxfamb, World Visionb, Care
Internationalb, Goalb, ADRAb
Group of NGOs implementing international relief and
development projects
UN World Food Programmeb UN agency dedicated to fighting hunger
UN Environment Programmed UN agency dedicated to preserving the environment
Global Road Safety
Partnershipa
Geneva-based NGO focused on promoting safer roads,
founded by UK Department for International
Development, the International Federation of the Red
Cross, and the World Bank
Private
corporations
Kjaer Groupa Supplier of vehicles to humanitarian organisations
Momentad UK-based design company selected to design and
draw up the toolkit
Volvoc Advising on truck maintenance
TNTa Global logistics company advising on training
Safe Wheelsd Train the trainer organisation
Shellc Advising on operating in Africa
BIGc Transport company
Johnson & Johnsonc Advising on fleet management
Sakhalinc Consortium comprising Gazprom, Shell, Mitsui and




Driver instructor course delivery
Notes: aCore partners; bimplementing agencies; cadvisory; dauxiliary partners
Table AI.
Organisations
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